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Abstract: Fossil fuel subsidies undermine efforts to mitigate climate change,
and they damage the trading system. Multilateral discussion is hampered by
inconsistent deﬁnitions and incomplete data, which could increase the risks
of WTO disputes. Members do not notify such subsidies as much as they
should under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM),
which limits the usefulness of the SCM Committee. The reports of the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism on individual countries and on the trading system
draw on a wider range of sources, creating an opportunity for non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to provide the missing data from publicly available sources.
We suggest a new template that could be used for such third-party notiﬁcations.
The objective is to shine a light on all fossil fuel subsidies that cause market
distortions, especially trade distortions. The result should be better, more
comparable data for the Secretariat, governments, and researchers, providing the
basis for better-informed discussion of the incidence of fossil fuel subsidies and
rationale for their use.
Energy subsidies can foster sustainable development, just as they can undermine
it. Sustainable development cannot be left on the shelf as a grand aspiration
to be trotted out when leaders need to make an inspirational speech. It has to
be built from the bottom up in full knowledge of the intricate detail of the
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multilateral system. Disciplines on energy subsidies are weak, but the World Trade
Organization (WTO) could offer more analysis and opportunities for discussion of
reform. The ﬁrst step is making more information available about fossil fuel
subsidies. This paper offers a proposal on how to achieve that objective.
Global fossil fuel subsidies are estimated to run at more than US$600 billion each
year (GSI, 2013a). These subsidies, found in both developed and developing
countries, signiﬁcantly undermine sustainable development, presenting both a lost
opportunity to spend government funds on other development priorities and an
obstacle in the transition to a low-carbon future. In addition to encouraging carbon
emissions, fossil fuel subsidies burden government budgets, create market dis-
tortions, and often do not meet the goals for which they were designed in the ﬁrst
place, such as providing energy access to the poor. In the absence of a global price
on carbon, it is imperative that we develop a more accurate picture of such
subsidies, ideally in a context where governments can discuss the rationale for their
use and the prospects for reform.
Governments increasingly acknowledge the need to do something about fossil
fuel subsidies, at least those that, according to G-20 Leaders, ‘encourage wasteful
consumption, reduce our energy security, impede investment in clean energy
sources and undermine efforts to deal with the threat of climate change’ (G-20,
2009). The International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) now publish regular estimates of bud-
getary support and tax expenditures for fossil fuel in developing and developed
countries, while the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are
increasing the level of support offered to developing countries to assist their
national reform processes. Over 110 countries mentioned fossil fuel subsidy reform
in their submissions to the preparatory process for the 19th Conference of the
Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; however, binding
international commitments to reform fossil fuel subsidies are unlikely in the near
term. Identifying a new pathway to achieve practical results would focus the efforts
of civil society and government champions.
Although many experts argue that energy should have a central place within the
WTO, potentially in a separate agreement covering its different trade-related
aspects (Cottier et al., 2011; ICTSD, 2011), currently the rules applicable to energy,
including energy-related goods and services, are to be found in different agree-
ments: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Agriculture. All goods sectors are
covered by the ASCM, but the applicability of the rules to fossil fuel subsidies is not
clear. Nevertheless, we think that the WTO offers an appropriate forum for
addressing issues relating to such harmful subsidies.
Fossil fuel subsidies, both to producers, often in rich countries, and to
consumers, often in poor countries, have the potential to distort markets
and resource allocation and hence trade ﬂows, not least in industries for
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which energy is an important intermediate input, such as steel, aluminum, glass,
and cement (Steenblik, 2010). To the extent that they subsidize ﬁnal consumption
of fossil fuels, such subsidies can increase imports, which is not normally seen as
harming trade. Nevertheless, while injury to speciﬁc ﬁrms or trading partners may
be hard to establish, the harm to the trading system is clear.
The inclusion of ﬁsheries subsidies on the agenda for the Doha Round set a
precedent for negotiations on subsidies that have negative impacts beyond trade
distortion. Reaching consensus on the fact that ﬁsheries subsidies represented
a suitable subject for WTO negotiations took years of effort by international or-
ganizations, governments, and NGOs. First was the patient work of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), regional ﬁshery commissions, and the OECD
in gathering information on the state of ﬁsh stocks and monitoring the effects of
ﬁshery operations. Second was a series of multilateral agreements that began to
build a governance regime for ﬁshery management. Third was the building of an
unconventional alliance of countries concerned with the impact of ﬁsh subsidies on
efforts to manage ﬁsh stocks sustainably. Fourth was the analytic and campaigning
power of civil society groups such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). These
groups demonstrated the need for reform, reframed the issue in WTO language,
and created pressure for action. The lesson is simple: without careful scientiﬁc and
political preparation, and without the formation of effective alliances, new issues
brought to the WTO are unlikely to be accepted or, where they are, to advance
(Steenblik, 1998).
The inability to conclude the ﬁsheries subsidies negotiations suggests, however,
that formally binding rules on fossil fuel subsidies may not be achievable in the
near term. The recent disputes on renewable energy similarly suggest that reliance
on litigation to clarify rules deliberately left ambiguous by Members may also not
be the best solution (Rubini, 2012: 558). We believe that Members, rather than
the Appellate Body, should set the scope for bad or good subsidies (Casier and
Moerenhout, 2013), but if Members do not begin to discuss the problem, the
Appellate Body may be solicited more often in future. It would be perverse to leave
many fossil fuel subsidies undisciplined while support for the development of
renewable energy is further entangled in complex rules (Meyer, 2013). If the WTO
is to play a role, however, it will have to be within existing rules. Better trans-
parency could help.
Trade policy transparency is an important tool for advancing policy objectives
and a non-coercive instrument for improving the operation of the trading system
(Wolfe, 2013). One of the questions in any international legal regime is the extent
to which differing national laws are functionally or recognizably similar. Trans-
parency mechanisms allow an assessment of whether national law, policy, and
implementation are consistent with a Member’s obligations. Such transparency
is also the basis for one actor to try to inﬂuence another actor to act differently.
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As a result of questions and challenge in a committee, a government may provide
more information, change policy, or pressure other units of government to respond.
Using WTO mechanisms for transparency and surveillance would allow Members
to discuss and negotiate the incidence and logic of subsidies instead of ﬁling one
dispute after another. The ASCM should be a useful tool, but this agreement is less
effective than it ought to be: Members fail to either notify their subsidies, or notify
only sporadically, and late. Inadequate transparency and surveillance in the
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Committee increases the risk of
resort to the dispute settlement system. An alternative is needed.
We begin in the next section by clarifying what is meant by ‘subsidy’, and how
that shapes the information available on fossil fuel subsidies. Our alternative to
reliance on dispute settlement to clarify WTO rules focuses on improving trans-
parency and surveillance, which we believe is more feasible given the current state
of negotiations in the Doha Round, but Members are unlikely to notify all their
fossil fuel subsidies to the SCM Committee. One way to encourage notiﬁcation of
such subsidies would be to allow them to be potentially ‘non-actionable’ under
Article 8 of the ASCM, but this article lapsed in 2000; in the second section, we
showwhy it is unlikely to be restored. In the third section, we suggest that the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) offers a better immediate forum. We show
that the TPR Secretariat has the ability to use information from a wide variety
of sources, which creates an opportunity, discussed in the fourth section, for
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide such third-party notiﬁcations.
For data to be useful, they ought to be provided in a standard format; in the ﬁfth
section, we propose a new template that NGOs could use to notify publicly
available information on fossil fuel subsidies to the WTO. We believe the WTO
offers both a framework and mechanisms for reviewing a broad range of trade-
related policies. In the conclusion, we discuss the broader implications of how such
engagement with civil society can contribute to the functioning of the WTO.
Improving the existing transparency and surveillance mechanisms would allow
Members to discuss both subsidies that foster sustainable development and
inefﬁcient subsidies that present a threat to the trading system, energy security, and
the global climate.
1. What is a subsidy? And what data are available?
This paper depends on two conceptual steps. First, we need a deﬁnition of
‘subsidy’. The notion that some actions of governments are subsidies and others not
may seem simple in economic theory, leading to claims that one deﬁnition would
do, but in practice deﬁnitions serve particular policy and analytic purposes. What
can be measured – and disciplined – depends on those deﬁnitions. Second, the
availability of data has been shaped by the deﬁnitions, with the result that some
debates about the extent and scope of energy subsidies are due to variations in how
they are measured (Steenblik, 2010). In thinking about a deﬁnition, we need not
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work though the full complexity of the meaning of the term (Jones and Steenblik,
2010), but we need to make it operational for our purposes. That is, we should be
able to identify fossil fuel subsidies, with common metrics to allow comparison.
The international organizations charged with action on fossil fuel subsidies differ
in their deﬁnitions and in their calculation method. Some overlap; some parts are
signiﬁcantly different. The WTO deﬁnition of subsidies in general is based on
legally binding reciprocal obligations aimed at improving the conditions of multi-
lateral trade through disciplines on government policy. Other international
organizations have more latitude to use speciﬁc deﬁnitions of fossil fuel subsidies
designed for analytic purposes or, especially in the case of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), to support a process of domestic reform. In this section, we
describe how each organization deﬁnes subsidies in general or fossil fuel subsidies
in particular. We conclude the section with a discussion of the implications for the
availability of data.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Since its inception as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC), the OECD has been concerned about state support to economic actors,
but the Secretariat avoids the word ‘subsidy’ because of the link with the WTO
legal agreements. Differences between sectors mean that it does not have a single
deﬁnition, but it does apply a common approach based on Producer Support
Estimates (PSE) and Consumer Support Estimates (CSE).
In its assessment of agricultural support, the OECD chose to make a distinction
between PSE and CSE. While the former consist of support to agriculture
producers, the latter measure transfers to consumers of agricultural commodities
(OECD, 2010). The same concept is now being used for fossil fuels. The OECD
measurement of support for fossil fuels includes both direct budgetary expenditures
and tax expenditures that in one way or the other provide a beneﬁt or lead to a
preference for fossil fuel production or consumption in comparison with alter-
natives. The OECD Secretariat admits that for analytic reasons, the scope of what is
considered ‘support’ is deliberately broader than some conceptions of ‘subsidy’
(OECD, 2012: 20). For example, the inventory includes ‘general service’ expenses
arising as a result of coal mining and the transition away from coal mining in
European countries, including early retirement payments for coal miners, support
for decommissioning and restructuring of the coal mining industry, and even
programs ﬁnancing remediation of environmental damage caused by coal mining.
Such programs would likely not fall within the WTO or IEA deﬁnitions or
indeed the conventional understanding of fossil fuel subsidies; nevertheless, as
the OECD approach urges, transparency about the measures taken is a necessary
ﬁrst step.
The OECD database has other limitations. Measuring tax expenditures is less
straightforward than measuring direct budgetary expenses, which can be readily
identiﬁed from government accounts. To calculate the tax expenditures, a
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benchmark has to be used. This benchmark is country dependent because every
country has a different perspective on the ‘normal’ taxation against which fossil
fuel taxation is measured. The benchmark is also highly dependent on the nature
and role of the overall taxation system of a country. In consequence, the inventory
was not designed for international comparability (OECD, 2012: 32–36).
The OECD Inventory also does not yet include estimates of government support
provided through risk transfers, concessional credit, and injections of funds into
state-owned enterprises. Market price support (transfers from consumers and
taxpayers to energy producers arising from policy measures creating a gap between
domestic producer prices and reference prices of a speciﬁc energy commodity) is
also not included for the moment (OECD, 2012: 22), mainly because it is no longer
provided by OECD countries. Transfers through price gaps on the consumer side
do not exist in OECD countries, with the exception of Mexico, but are included in
the estimates of fossil fuel (consumption) subsidies by the IEA.1
International Energy Agency (IEA)
The International Energy Agency approach to measuring fossil fuel consumption
subsidies is based on the price-gap approach, whereby the national end price to
consumers is compared to an international reference price. When the international
reference price is higher than the end-user price, the difference is assumed to be due
to a subsidy. While this method is relatively straightforward, the disadvantages
have to be kept in mind (IEA, 2013).
First, discussions continue on the calculation of the reference price. Second, this
method will not capture a subsidy that is not reﬂected in the end-user price of the
fossil fuel. For example, governments can decide to subsidize domestic oil and gas
producers who in turn use the subsidies for new technologies or for exploring
hydrocarbon resources that they could otherwise not afford to develop. These
actions, however, do not necessarily lead to a change in the market price of fossil
fuels, yet they are clearly subsidies (Koplow, 2009). Third, in many OECD
countries end-user prices are set at the reference price level, or even above due to
taxes, which does not mean that no subsidies for fossil fuels exist in these countries.
The IEA captures fossil fuel consumption subsidies in developing countries and
emerging economies, most of which have not yet been estimated by the OECD, but
leaves out the subsidies of developed countries, including those of IEA Members.
The two datasets are therefore to some extent complementary. The IEA data are
only quantitative and not well documented, while the OECD Inventory gives an
1 The Panel in the Canada−Renewable Energy (WTO, 2012a) case dodged the question of whether
such measures constitute price support. Based on the ﬁndings of the Panel in China–GOES (WTO, 2012d),
however, these measures are arguably price support as deﬁned in the ASCM. The Panel states that price
support refers to measures to keep producer prices above a certain minimum. Read in the context of the
ASCM there needs to be some indication of direct government intervention in order not to deﬁne all
governmental measures with an incidental effect on market prices as a subsidy under the ASCM.
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overview of the policy measures behind the numbers as well. The IEA data come
from market calculations carried out by the IEA while the data of the OECD come
from documented government sources. Both include the amount of the subsidy but
the OECD’s information is more complete and more useful because it not only
reports on the amount of the subsidy, as the IEA does, but also provides
information on the department that is responsible for the subsidy, what type of
subsidy it is (tax exemption or direct transfer), the conditions for getting the
subsidy, and so on. The IEA does not provide this information.
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
The IMF deﬁnes energy subsidies in a broad way to include both production and
consumption subsidies (Clements et al., 2013). The IMF ﬁrst calculates con-
sumption subsidies according to the price-gap method (drawing in part on IEA
estimates). They then add budgetary support to producers (currently estimated by
the OECD) in what the IMF calls a pre-tax subsidy: the extent to which the price
that the consumer pays is below supply and distribution costs. In a second step, the
IMF also estimates for each country what it calls a post-tax subsidy to draw a full
picture of the degree of under-pricing. A post-tax subsidy is deemed to exist if the
tax on fossil fuels is below the IMF’s rough approximation of its efﬁcient level. For
the IMF, efﬁcient taxation would require that (1) all consumption of fossil fuels is
subject to taxation, and (2) that a corrective tax is introduced to capture the
negative externalities of fossil fuel consumption, including externalities not directly
proportional to fuel use, such as the costs of trafﬁc accidents and congestion. Thus,
the main difference between the IMF estimates and the OECD is the former’s
inclusion of a corrective tax for negative externalities.
The Group of Twenty Leaders’ Summit (G-20)
Deﬁnitional ambiguity bedevils the commitments made by G-20 Leaders in 2009 to
phase out inefﬁcient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption.2
Their Working Group on Energy and Commodity Markets, which is responsible
for progress on the commitment, has not agreed on a deﬁnition, which leaves G-20
Members with discretion to use their own deﬁnition, with the unsurprising result
that 11 Members claimed that they had no inefﬁcient fossil fuel subsidies to report
(Koplow, 2012; GSI, 2013b). It is unclear what kind of subsidies countries do
address in their voluntary reports, which are incoherent and do not give a proper
overview of the fossil fuel subsidies of a country. In order to improve progress on
the commitment, at the 2012 Summit in Los Cabos, G-20 leaders requested that
Finance Ministers develop a voluntary peer review process to increase transparency
2 The exact language was agreement ‘To phase out and rationalize over the medium term inefﬁcient
fossil fuel subsidies while providing targeted support for the poorest. Inefﬁcient fossil fuel subsidies
encourage wasteful consumption, reduce our energy security, impede investment in clean energy sources
and undermine efforts to deal with the threat of climate change’ (G-20, 2009).
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in the fossil fuel subsidies debate. Different forms of peer-review mechanisms have
been discussed by the Working Group; in a ﬁrst step, China and the United States
committed in December 2013 to initiate reciprocal peer reviews. G-20 peer review
may eventually provide a forum in which ofﬁcials can discuss issues related to fossil
fuel subsidies, but is unlikely to lead to a signiﬁcant increase in reporting of
subsidies in the short term, although the peer review teams might refer to data
reported elsewhere.
World Trade Organization
Nobody doubts that subsidies can have an effect on trade, and subsidies were
covered in GATT 1947, but negotiators were unable to devise a practical deﬁnition
of subsidy until the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994. The ﬁrst part of the
deﬁnition of a subsidy in Article 1.1 of the ASCM requires a ﬁnancial contribution
or price or income support provided by the government. The ﬁnite list of types of
ﬁnancial contributions includes: when a government transfers funds directly; when
government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected; when a
government provides goods or services below the market rate or purchases above
the market rate; or when a government works through a funding mechanism to
provide any of the aforementioned ﬁnancial contributions. This list is the basis for
the left-hand column of the GSI energy subsidies checklist found in Appendix 1
below. The second part of the deﬁnition, Article 1.2, requires that a beneﬁt be con-
ferred to the recipient, which entails an exercise of comparison between a situation
in which a recipient receives the ﬁnancial contribution and one in which it does not.
Both Articles 1.1 and 1.2 imply that certain economic support measures do not
fall under the scope of the ASCM and are therefore unregulated by the WTO, and
do not need to be notiﬁed. The ASCM classiﬁed subsidies as either prohibited,
actionable, or non-actionable. Two categories of subsidies, import substitution and
export subsidies, are prohibited (Article 3). In order for a Member to take action
against a ‘harmful’ subsidy of another Member, a subsidy has to be speciﬁc (Article
2) and the adverse effects have to be demonstrated (Article 5 and 6). (We will have
more to say on the non-actionable category below.)
The subsidy deﬁnition is designed to be applied by Members either in notifying
speciﬁc subsidies to the SCM Committee (Article 25), in the application of
countervailing duty measures (ASCM Part V), and in making a complaint in the dis-
pute settlement system. The SCMCommittee is mandated to examine these subsidy
notiﬁcations on a regular basis (Article 26). Under Article 25.8 of the ASCM,
Members are allowed to request information on subsidies that they think another
Member was obliged to notify, and Article 25.10 provides a formal mechanism
through which Members can counter-notify subsidies of another Member.
This deﬁnition is sufﬁciently ambiguous with respect to both speciﬁcity and
beneﬁt to the recipient that Members are not always clear about what it covers, and
the jurisprudence is confusing. In the Canada–Renewable Energy case, for
example, both the original panel and the Appellate Body struggled with ﬁnding
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the appropriate benchmark for comparison, with insufﬁcient evidence to demon-
strate that a beneﬁt was conferred.3 The Panel also could not agree on the deﬁnition
of a subsidy, resulting in a dissenting opinion of one panelist. On appeal, the
Appellate Body avoided ruling on whether the disputed measure, Ontario’s Feed-In
Tariff program, constituted a subsidy (WTO, 2012a; WTO 2013a; see also Casier
and Moerenhout, 2013). This conceptual ambiguity is not new, and it affects the
quality and amount of information available from WTO notiﬁcations. Only
subsidies that meet the ASCM deﬁnition have to be notiﬁed, but when a beneﬁt
analysis is inconclusive, Members may decide not to notify the measure, although
ideally when in doubt, they ought to notify.
Early on, the SCM Committee designed a questionnaire for subsidy notiﬁcations
under Article 25 and established procedures for annual Committee review of
notiﬁcations (WTO, 2003d). It soon became apparent, however, that WTO
Members, including many of the largest developed Members, were woefully
deﬁcient in meeting the notiﬁcation obligations – and they still are (WTO, 2006,
2012b). Given the inadequacies and ambiguities of the notiﬁcation questionnaire
derived from the ASCM, the poor quality of the data is not surprising.
The SCM questionnaire states that the following subsidies are subject to
notiﬁcation: ‘a) all speciﬁc subsidies . . . and b) all other subsidies, which operate
directly or indirectly to increase exports. . .’. The legal text and the jurisprudence
fail, however, to clarify the conditions under which subsidies are speciﬁc. Indeed
the concept lacks any real economic justiﬁcation: it is just an administrative – and
pliable – tool to select measures (Rubini, 2009: 359–366). The distinction between
a speciﬁc and non-speciﬁc subsidy in economic terms does not seem to make much
sense. A subsidy that is used to correct a market failure might well be as effective (or
more effective) when targeted at particular industries or enterprises than a generally
available subsidy (Howse, 2010). The general rule is that speciﬁc subsidies are
those that only apply to certain enterprises. The Article explains that only when
conditions for eligibility of a subsidy are clearly deﬁned in law can a subsidy be
speciﬁc. But even if that is not the case, a subsidy can be de facto speciﬁc if a
particular industry or sector beneﬁts disproportionally.
Also difﬁcult is that part of the questionnaire that requests ‘Statistical data
permitting an assessment of the trade effects of the subsidy’. Whether a subsidy has
trade effects requires a judgment by the notiﬁer, one that does not lend itself to a
quick assessment by government ofﬁcials – not surprisingly, such data (which may
3 The AB stated that for a ﬁnding of a beneﬁt one has to (1) deﬁne the relevant market and (2) ﬁnd the
appropriate benchmark within that market. After deﬁning that the relevant market was the market for
renewable energy – despite the substitutability of electricity produced by renewable and conventional
energy sources – the AB determined the benchmark to be found in a competitive market for solar and wind
energy with the characteristics of Ontario’s market. It eventually concluded that due to the ‘complexity of
the issues . . . and the absence of full exploration of the issues before the panel’ it could not determine
whether a beneﬁt was conferred (paragraph 5.244 of the AB report)
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be perceived as a confession inviting a dispute) are rarely provided (Collins-
Williams and Wolfe, 2010). But Members do notify all kinds of subsidies, both
ones that are clearly speciﬁc, and ones that might be general at ﬁrst sight but may be
speciﬁc when taking into account all elements for the application of the subsidy.
Given the different, incomplete and sometimes unclear notiﬁcations that Members
have submitted to the WTO, it seems Members are not clear on what the deﬁnition
covers and as a consequence are unclear on which subsidies they ought to notify.4
Rubini (2012) argues that in line with the EU approach to state aid, governments
might choose to notify all subsidies instead of going through the unclear assessment
of whether a subsidy is speciﬁc. Such notiﬁcation will allow questions to be asked
in the Committee.
Summary: comparing deﬁnitions and data
Given these differing deﬁnitions used by international organizations, it is hardly
surprising that what they report differs. The IEA, reﬂecting its long expertise
in monitoring energy markets, uses market data and can, as a result of its
methodology, miss government measures that clearly amount to economic support,
or it might include elements that constitute a price gap that is not caused by
government action.
Deﬁnitional ambiguities notwithstanding, our review of notiﬁcations under
the ASCM found that Members have sporadically notiﬁed a variety of support
measures (grants, loans, tax and excise exemptions, and others) that amount to
fossil fuel subsidies, even if not labeled as such. The United States and Japan have
been particularly forthcoming; the United States even notiﬁed several sub-federal
subsidization programs, notably an oil- and gas-production tax credit offered by
the state of Alaska to promote oil exploration and drilling. The notiﬁed Japanese
measures were mostly related to overseas oil and gas exploration and to research
and development (R&D). India has notiﬁed several sub-federal fossil fuel subsidy
programs in the ﬁshery sector, typically consisting of rebates on fuel taxes for ‘poor
ﬁshermen’. (Fuel subsidies, which may account for 20% of ﬁsheries subsidies, were
a major sticking point in the Doha Round negotiations.) The most recent Russian
subsidy notiﬁcations include only one fossil fuel program, although independent
researchers have been able to identify a range of fossil fuel subsidies based on the
SCM deﬁnition (Gerasimchuk, 2012).
The OECD Inventory (OECD, 2012) relies on publicly available government
data, which is information that could have been notiﬁed to the WTO. A com-
parison found that in most cases the OECD Inventory covered many more support
measures than the WTO notiﬁcations, and in more detail, as shown in Appendix 3.
Where the OECD inventory contains 640 measures for the 2008–2013 period,
4 Compare the large difference between the German subsidies identiﬁed by Thone and Debroschke
(2008) and the subsidies Germany notiﬁed to the WTO.
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the WTO has only 64. Particularly on the sub-federal level, the OECD Inventory,
compiled by the Secretariat, included more than governments themselves notiﬁed to
the WTO, especially for Australia, Canada, and the United States, although the
United States was able to notify some sub-federal level subsidies to the WTO. Our
comparison in Appendix 3 includes reports to the G-20, since leaders have called
for voluntary reporting and peer review. The G-20 data are also inadequate, ﬁnding
only 35 measures thought to fall within the reporting obligation, because states are
required to report only on inefﬁcient fossil fuel subsidies that contribute to wasteful
consumption, which is of course open to interpretation. Some inconsistencies
between the G-20 and the WTO are puzzling, perhaps owing to the differing
deﬁnitions, or the nature of subsequent surveillance. We see detailed reporting of
fossil fuel subsidies by Japan in the SCMCommittee, but in the G-20, Japan reports
that it has no inefﬁcient fossil fuel subsidies. By contrast, Argentina, Canada,
Indonesia and Italy reported fossil fuel subsidies to the G-20, but not to the WTO.
One of the strengths of the WTO is the opportunity for Members to hold
each other to account, for example by reviewing subsidies notiﬁcations in the
SCM Committee.
As Table 1 shows, our probe of the most recent ﬁve years’ experience in the
committee found that Members did raise questions about fossil fuel subsidies
notiﬁcation. Some questions were related to the identiﬁcation of beneﬁciaries of the
subsidies and eligibility criteria, information that according to the WTO question-
naire should have been provided with the notiﬁcation, but the committee has not
yet had a thorough discussion of fossil fuel subsidies. While not directly relevant to
the focus of this paper, we note in passing that the record of notiﬁcation and
surveillance of renewable energy subsidies is somewhat stronger, as is shown in the
three right columns of Table 1.
Both the rate of notiﬁcation of fossil fuel subsidies and the paucity of questions in
the committee are no doubt a reﬂection ﬁrst of the ambiguities with respect to the
deﬁnition of subsidies discussed above, and of the usual ‘glass house’ syndrome.
Members do notify some fossil fuel subsidies (perhaps those that are least likely to
be challenged?), and they do ask for more detailed information on the notiﬁed
support measures. If the information available from the WTO was comprehensive
in its coverage of countries and measures, this paper would not be necessary. But
the information on fossil fuel subsidies is inadequate, as it is for subsidies generally
(on the inadequacy of subsidies notiﬁcation in general, see Collins-Williams and
Wolfe, 2010).
In sum, the WTO already discusses fossil fuel subsidies, but inconsistently and
based on data that are less complete than those available to other international or-
ganizations, but it has a treaty-based deﬁnition of ‘subsidy’, and robust surveillance
mechanisms that could be better used. If we wish to improve discussion of fossil fuel
subsidies, we need to think about how to improve the data available, but the prior
question is where such data could be used at the WTO. In the next section, we
discuss why the SCM Committee is not a candidate.
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2. What happened to ‘non-actionable’ subsidies in the WTO?
The WTO struggles with disciplines on subsidies. On the one hand, subsidies have
the potential of creating unfair competitive advantages, leading to trade distortions.
On the other hand, subsidies can be a useful instrument for economic and social
purposes. Unfortunately, Members do not always agree on which is which. Both
the ASCM and the Agreement on Agriculture use a trafﬁc light system. In
Agriculture, Article 7 and Appendix 2, known as the Green Box, cover domestic
support that is thought to be ‘minimally trade distorting’. The analog in the ASCM
was Article 8 on ‘non-actionable’ subsidies, but that provision of the agreement has
lapsed. A revived Article 8 that included energy subsidies is one of the possible
mechanisms that would allowMembers to notify their fossil fuel subsidies in a way
that would increase the availability of information, and provide the basis for dis-
cussion on such subsidies in the SCM Committee.
Table 1. Questions asked about fossil fuel subsidies programs and renewable
energy subsidy programs in the SCM Committee, 2008–2013
Countries
Fossil Fuel
Subsidies
(FFS)
notiﬁed
Questions
received
about FFS
Questions
asked
(of others)
about FFS
Renewable
energy (RE)
subsidies
notiﬁed
Questions
received
about RE
subsidies
Questions
asked (of others)
about RE
subsidies
Albania 1 0 0 0 0 0
Australia 3 0 3 3 2 1
Brazil 1 1 1 0 0 2
Canada 0 0 2 4 1 3
China 0 0 0 3 1 0
Costa Rica 0 0 0 1 0 0
European Union 7 2 2 38 3 6
India* 11 1 5 0 0 2
Japan 13 3 0 5 6 2
Korea 1 1 0 0 0 0
Mexico 2 1 0 0 0 0
Norway 1 0 0 3 0 0
Peru 1 0 0 0 0 0
Russian
Federation
1 0 0 0 0 0
Taiwan 2 1 0 0 0 1
Turkey 0 0 1 0 0 1
Ukraine 1 1 0 0 0 0
United States 14
(8 federal)
5 2 69
(6 federal)
11 6
Totals 59 16 16 126 24 24
Note: * All fossil fuel subsidy programs in the Indian notiﬁcation G/SCM/N/220/IND of 11 May 2012
were state-level programs providing fuel subsidies to ﬁshermen.
Source: SCM Committee minutes G/SCM/M/62 through G/SCM/M/84.
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While a revival of the category of non-actionable subsidies is often discussed
within the context of government support for renewable energy (Howse, 2010),
in this section we explore whether a revival of Article 8 would be a way to bring
more information on fossil fuel subsidies to the SCM Committee.5 Notiﬁcation of
a measure as potentially non-actionable would not shield it from challenge in the
Committee or the dispute settlement system.6 Such notiﬁcation would not increase
the risk of a complaint (we discuss transparency and the risk of disputes below) but
it would allow Members to discuss whether the harm to or beneﬁt for the planet of
a particular subsidy is a relevant policy consideration. In this section, we review the
negotiating history of Article 8, concluding that a revival is improbable.
From the start, the Uruguay Round negotiations that created the ASCM reﬂected
ideological differences among Members on subsidies. The United States, unlike
other leading Members, such as the EU, Switzerland, and Canada, had never been
in favour of subsidization in general because of possible market distorting effects
(Stewart, 1993: 875–877). But negotiators recognized that because subsidies can
be used to correct market failures and can be desirable when pursuing certain
economic and social objectives, not all subsidies should be prohibited or subject to
countervailing duties (GATT, 1987b). In the early days of the Uruguay Round,
doubts were even raised as to whether Members would give up their sovereign right
to use subsidies (GATT, 1987b: 3).
In 1988, Switzerland proposed a trafﬁc light approach, establishing three
categories of subsidies, and attaching different legal effects to each of them (GATT,
1988b; Croome, 1998). A ﬁrst category consists of export subsidies and local con-
tent subsidies that are aimed at giving domestic industries competitive advantages.
These subsidies would be prohibited. A second category consisted of actionable
subsidies and could be subject to countervailing duties when it has been established
that material injury is caused. A third category was the ‘green light’ category and
consisted of subsidies that do not have a trade-distortive effect or that should be
allowed because they serve a purpose that would be accepted as legitimate.
While there was naturally a relatively broad consensus on the non-actionability
of generally available subsidies, perhaps because they were considered to have a
minimally distortive effect on trade, the list of other non-actionable subsidies was
more problematic (GATT, 1989d; GATT, 1989e; GATT, 1990a). Some negotiators
questioned why the ‘green light’ category had to exist in the ﬁrst place (GATT,
1989c); some wanted a strict deﬁnition of non-actionable subsidies, and others
5Other suggestions to include fossil fuel subsidies under WTO negotiations have been made. For
example, in the negotiations on environmental goods and services, one can argue that fossil fuel subsidies
are an important barrier to the development of renewable energy-related goods and their dissemination;
they could therefore be addressed under the barriers to environmental goods and services (Howse, 2010).
6 A subsidy notiﬁed under Article 8 presumably would not be subject to the disciplines of the ASCM
because it was taken for speciﬁc purposes that were allowed, but the Article 8 – status of the measure could
always be challenged by other Members.
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advocated for a broad category in which the intent of a subsidy has to be taken into
account when assessing its non-actionable status. Other Members underlined the
need for taking the effect of a subsidy into account, not its intent (GATT, 1988a;
GATT, 1988c: 11). Developing countries wanted to include structural adjustment
subsidies under the non-actionable category (GATT, 1989f); other countries did
the same for regional subsidies, and the EC, Canada, and Switzerland were strongly
in favour of carving out environmental subsidies and R&D subsidies (GATT,
1987a; GATT, 1989a; GATT, 1989b; GATT, 1989g; GATT, 1989h).
During preparations for the Brussels Ministerial Conference in 1990, the
United States remained strongly opposed to the category of non-actionable sub-
sidies (Croome, 1998: 173–174), while the EC pursued a more nuanced perspective
in the sense of being prepared to allow subsidies with no signiﬁcant effect on
international trade (Stewart, 1993: 875–877). The US approach to non-actionable
subsidies changed after Bill Clinton became President in 1993. The general view
that subsidies were bad was more nuanced than before because the new ad-
ministration saw R&D as particularly important for the US economy (Doane,
1995). This shift in the position of the United States helped to facilitate a conclusion
to the negotiations on the ASCM.
Uncertainty about the non-actionable category was reﬂected in Article 31, which
required a review after ﬁve years with a determination of whether to extend or
modify Article 8. In the last meeting of the SCM Committee before the 1999
Ministerial Conference in Seattle, some Members (e.g., Switzerland and Canada)
worried that not extending Article 8 would give the wrong signal to the public and
would ‘reduce the ability of the ASCM to address environmental concerns’ (Bigdeli,
2011: 9). Several developing country Members countered that extension of the
provision in its present form would be unacceptable since the category provided ad-
vantages only for developed countries (WTO, 1999). The United States had mixed
views on the extension, noting that in the ﬁve years of its provisional application,
no non-actionable subsidy had been notiﬁed (Bigdeli, 2011). In the absence of
consensus, the category lapsed almost unnoticed shortly after the 1999 Seattle
Conference.
Members showed little interest in negotiations on any subsidies issues during
the Doha Round, with the exception of ﬁsheries subsidies, but Venezuela, Cuba,
and the EU each submitted proposals on non-actionable subsidies. The proposal
of Venezuela emphasized that Article 8 could not be reactivated without
modiﬁcation to ensure that developing country structural adjustment subsidies
would not be subject to countervailing measures or challenges in a dispute (WTO,
2002a). Developed countries were skeptical of the proposal, and other developing
countries argued that the provision would have to be reformulated and be more
balanced with regards to the interest of developing countries (WTO, 2003a; WTO,
2003b; WTO, 2003c). The EU proposal to reactivate Article 8 started from the
perspective of why the category was never used (WTO, 2002b). The discussions
quickly showed that the diverging opinions that were already present in the
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Uruguay Round negotiations had not disappeared. Similarly, the discussions on
ﬁsheries subsidies, where some proposals were made to classify ‘good’ and ‘bad’
subsidies, resulted in the same outcome: countries could not agree on the class-
iﬁcation criteria and expressed considerable scepticism about whether the real
purpose of the proposal was conservation of ﬁsh stocks, not the effects of subsidies
on trade.
The different opinions on which subsidies could be considered non-actionable
and which ones not indicate that a revival of the non-actionable category only for
the purpose of environmental subsidies would be difﬁcult, and would inevitably
lead to long negotiations with all kinds of other subsidies proposed for the non-
actionable category (Horlick, 2013). And yet this history shows that negotiators
have long understood that subsidies that have an environmental effect are an issue.
For years after the lapse of Article 8 it seemed that governments acted as if the
provision was still in place; that is, Members understand the logic of why certain
subsidies ought to be non-actionable, and have acted accordingly. Until 2010, cases
on energy-related subsidies were rare, perhaps reﬂecting a tacit agreement not to
challenge programs designed to promote renewable energy (Rubini, 2012). That
tacit agreement now seems fragile.
3. Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM)
With no prospect of restoring the non-actionable category to the ASCM, a helpful
alternative forum to generate more information about fossil fuel subsidies with an
opportunity for discussion is the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB).7 The central
objective of the TPRB is ‘to contribute to . . . the smoother functioning of the
multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and understand-
ing of, the trade policies and practices of Members’. The TPRB generates three
sorts of reports – the periodic Trade Policy Review (TPR) of each Member (WTO,
2011a: paras. 178 ff.), the annual review of the state of the trading system, and the
monitoring reports on measures taken in response to the ﬁnancial crisis. In these
reports to the TPRB, issued on the authority of the Director-General, not Members,
the Secretariat sometimes warns or expresses worries on the basis of its analysis,
but never criticizes Members explicitly, and never comments on their rights and
obligations under the WTO agreements. Discussion in the TPRB therefore does not
imply either that a measure is or is not actionable.
7 Robert Howse has recently suggested that the SCM Committee could adopt an interpretive statement
creating policy space for renewable subsidies (Howse in ICTSD, 2013), something surely not needed by
fossil fuel subsidies, but we do think that the harm to the trading system from fossil fuel subsidies is
sufﬁciently ambiguous that increased opportunities for transparency and surveillance should be found,
rather than waiting for more disputes.
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Monitoring subsidies falls within the mandate of the TPRB. Subsidies, called
‘General Economic Support Measures’, have been a particular concern in the crisis
monitoring exercise because they clearly increased after September 2008, with
undoubted effects on the trading system for good as well as ill, but neither the
SCM Committee nor the TPRB has enough data to form a complete picture.
Annex 4 of the most recent annual monitoring report (WTO, 2012c) is a valiant
attempt, but the Secretariat observed that assessment is inevitably biased because of
the paucity of information provided by Members, sometimes because they claim
that the relevant supports are not ‘new measures’ and hence not covered by the
process. The TPR reports on individual Members face the same difﬁculty.
Data on support measures are found in various sections of the reports rather
than in one place. While the reports are among the few sources of systematically
collected subsidies data, they are not strictly comparable, the Secretariat observes,
because the absence or presence of data in the report on any one country may be an
artifact of the information problems, rather than an indication that the member
does or does not maintain such subsidies (WTO, 2012c: para. 118).
The reports already take notice of energy subsidies. Indonesia’s energy con-
sumption subsidies are large, andwell known, at close to 29%of central government
spending in one recent year (WTO, 2013c: para. 1.11). TheTPR report by the Secret-
ariat includes information on energy subsidies and the problems of their reform
that were not included in the report that was prepared by Indonesia. In a recent
periodic monitoring report, Annex 4 on ‘General Economic Support Measures’ in
the Director-General’s annual monitoring report (e.g. WTO, 2012c) is a valiant
attempt, but the Secretariat observed that assessment is inevitably biased because of
the paucity of information provided byMembers, sometimes because they claim that
the relevant supports are not ‘new measures’ and hence not covered by the process.
There is a conﬁrmed Brazilian subsidy program for ethanol mentioned, and an
unconﬁrmed US tax credit for the wind power industry (WTO, 2013b: 68 and 72).
Scholars recognize the potential of the TPRM as a forum in which both the trade
policies of Members and issues that go beyond trade to include the broader econ-
omic policy of a country can be discussed without prejudice to legal compliance
with WTO obligations (Chaisse andMatsushita, 2013: 13–14; see also Charnovitz,
2010: 755–756), but opinions diverge about the scope of its mandate and on how
to improve the mechanism. Developing countries are hesitant to give the moni-
toring and surveillance mechanisms in the WTO more weight out of a fear that the
bigger, more powerful Members would prescribe their trade policies (Ghosh,
2010). Some academics consider the current mandate too restrictive (Ghosh, 2010:
437–438), others hold that the TPRM within its current mandate can be improved
with respect both to information gathering and the participation of civil society
(Zahrnt, 2009: 11–12). The Director-General stretched the mandate in 2009 to
justify monitoring measures related to the ﬁnancial crisis as requested by the G-20
(Wolfe, 2012). In 2011, the Ministerial Conference formally recognized the crisis-
monitoring exercise and asked that it be continued and strengthened (WTO, 2011b).
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The core of each TPR report is based on the notiﬁcations from Members, but
each report depends on a far wider range of information. The Secretariat collects
data from ofﬁcial sources (questionnaires to Member under review) and non-
ofﬁcial sources, including from other international organizations, media reports,
and NGOs (Ghosh, 2011: 431; Chaisse and Matsushita, 2013; Hoekman, 2011:
18–19). To ensure accuracy, the Secretariat seeks veriﬁcation of the data from non-
ofﬁcial sources when discussing the draft of its report with the Member (WTO,
2011a: para. 180).
The crisis monitoring reports and annual reports on the trading system use a
similar method. The 2012 monitoring report notes that responses were received
from around 60% of the 43 delegations (counting the EU as one) who were asked
to verify information received from other sources (WTO, 2012c: para. 19). Many
delegations either verify the information, or provide more accurate information,
but some responses are less helpful: certain delegations request the Secretariat to
delete all information because the measures are not based on legal instruments, or
they simply refuse to verify any information whose source is the public media
(WTO, 2013b: 21). In such cases, the Secretariat cannot use the data, but if they
have evidence that a disputed measure is based on legislation, or if a delegation fails
to respond to a request for veriﬁcation, the measure will be still included in reports
as ‘unveriﬁed’.
We think that all three sorts of TPR reports ought to have a speciﬁc section on
fossil fuel subsidies. Given the poor record of notiﬁcation on subsidies in general,
and the ambiguities about whether subsidies that might not be speciﬁc even ought
to be notiﬁed, the Secretariat needs help in generating the data from non-WTO
sources.
Do notiﬁcations put members at risk of disputes?
Why are Members reluctant to verify third-party data? One of the ‘urban myths’ of
the WTO is that what other Members do not know cannot be the subject of a
dispute, and hence Members are reluctant to allow potentially embarrassing
information to be made available. The evidence does not support this fear. Some
research has been conducted on the relation between the TPRM and complaints in
the dispute settlement system. One study compared disputes ﬁled by the NAFTA
countries with the respective TPRs. The results showed that the number of
measures identiﬁed in the TPRs for which a complaint was ﬁled was low, which
could indicate that the more measures are notiﬁed and subsequently discussed in
the TPR, the less likely that they lead to formal disputes (Froese, 2012). Another
study of a wider range of disputes found that about half of the measures in dispute
settlement complaints could be found in the TPR reports, but only 15% of the
mentions in a TPR report had any detailed policy analysis or criticism of the policy
at issue (Ghosh, 2010: 441).
The likelihood of disputes is also diminished by the complexities of making a
complaint in the dispute settlement system, which impose high hurdles for all
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Members. Having found a possible problem, Bown (2011: 170) argues, a ﬁrm and
its advisers must ask:
(1) What is the likelihood of a WTO ﬁnding of a legal inconsistency of any
particular measure?
(2) How large is the lost foreign market access at stake?
(3) Was this WTO violation a sufﬁciently important economic cause of lost foreign
market access?
(4) What is the legal-political likelihood as well as the form of compliance of the
respondent with any WTO rulings?
As Bown shows, the analytic and ﬁnancial resources needed to answer these
questions are signiﬁcant (Bown, 2009: 104 ff). In the case of crisis monitoring,
where the Secretariat reports go well beyond formal notiﬁcations, they ‘generated
few additional details that could be used by an analyst to help determine whether
such a measure was an economically important cause of a reduction to its country’s
exports’ (Bown, 2011: 166).
We believe that increased discussion of fossil fuel subsidies, or any kind of energy
subsidies for that matter, is not likely to lead to an increase in conﬂict among
Members. The greater risk is that Members will fail to pick up on the data made
available in a TPR. The more the information on fossil fuel subsidies is linked to a
potential (negative) trade effect, the more likely it is to be discussed among WTO
Members. The more questions that are asked in Geneva, and the more governments
at home are asked to justify their policies, the greater the prospects for subsidy
reform. The next question is whether third parties, like NGOs, can help in making
more information available.
4. The role of NGOs and third-party notiﬁcation
Many international organizations make use of third-party data (Mitchell, 1998).
Of particular relevance, many NGOs have a recognized role in contributing to the
work of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) where they can enhance
the knowledge base available to the MEA (Oberthür et al., 2002). Of course, many
of the relevant NGOs are based in or funded from the G7 countries, which makes
the emerging economies wary (Kahler, 2013: 719), but their role can be essential.
One of the strengths of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is its ability to work closely with Trade
Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce (TRAFFIC), an NGO whose
purpose is essentially to support CITES by providing information on illegal trade
in endangered species (Oberthür et al., 2002; Wolfe and Baddely, 2012: 7–12).
Other examples include Greenpeace International providing information on illegal
trade to the Secretariat of the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Okaru, 2011), or Greenpeace and the WWF
providing information to the scientiﬁc body of the UNFCCC. The Alternative
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Fluorocarbon Environmental Acceptability Study provides information on the
production of ozone-depleting substances used by Parties to the Montreal Protocol.
Finally, the Ramsar Convention has concluded several memoranda of cooperation
with NGOs and has given certain duties to the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (Oberthür et al., 2002).
Independent researchers can generate useful reports on fossil fuel subsidies from
publicly available data – see for example Oosterhuis (2013) – but the effort can be
resource-intensive. Nevertheless, as long as data exist in the public domain, any-
body who understands subsidies and taxes (and the local language, if important)
can put together a set of estimates. One obvious source of data is the OECD, as
suggested by Tim Josling and Klaus Mittenzwei (2013) in an approach to the
problem of incomplete and late notiﬁcation of agriculture subsidies. They argue
that OECD Producer Support Estimates (PSE) data on farm subsidies are comple-
mentary to WTO notiﬁcation data, despite the slightly differing conceptual bases.
A virtue of exploiting that complementarity would be the ability to calculate
provisional or ‘pre-notiﬁcations’ (synthetic notiﬁcations for years for which ofﬁcial
notiﬁcations are not yet available) from recent OECD data, since the OECD dataset
is updated autonomously, and nearly continuously, meaning its data are much
more timely than WTO agriculture notiﬁcations. The issue has apparently pro-
voked lively debate in the TPRB, participants say, since developing countries led by
Brazil and India argue that the WTO should not use OECD data (WTO, 2009).
However, that should not stop NGOs from doing so.
Where information is incomplete or unclear, NGOs can resort to ‘provocative
notiﬁcation’, a process of notifying what information is available or has been dug
up. Where this information is incorrect – and in particular where it suggests sub-
sidies larger than they are in reality – this kind of notiﬁcation provides an incentive
for the country in question to provide the correct information, if only to counter the
impact of the ﬂawed NGO notiﬁcation. The GSI’s reporting of EU biofuel subsidies
provoked the Commission to respond by giving more accurate and up-to-date
ﬁgures than those available to the GSI (Charles et al., 2013). The transparency
objective had been achieved.
In the WTO, NGOs can contribute as knowledge brokers helping to facilitate the
discussion betweenMembers and contribute to better policies (Perez-Esteve, 2012).
In the dispute settlement system, this function is already formalised by allowing
NGOs to submit amicus curiae briefs. NGOs also have a role to play, however,
before issues reach the dispute settlement phase. Guidelines adopted by the General
Council in 1996 (WTO, 1996) include the possibility of ‘informal arrangements to
receive the information NGOs may wish to make available for consultation by the
interested delegations’. While no formal process exists (yet) for NGOs to submit
notiﬁcations, and the general economic support measures identiﬁed in the
context of the trade monitoring exercise are not included in the public database,
the Secretariat does use NGO data that are relevant. For example, in the crisis
monitoring undertaken by the TPRB, the Secretariat makes use of data published
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by Global Trade Alert (Wolfe, 2012; Wolfe, 2013). WTO rules for engagement
with NGOs are unlikely to become more formal (Pandey, 2013), but current rules
do allow sufﬁcient scope for NGOs to provide information on energy subsidies in a
form that would be useful for the WTO. We know that if an NGO provides good
data, the Secretariat can and will use it. The 2014 TPR report on Malaysia has an
extensive discussion of energy subsidies, over half the total (WTO, 2014). The
report draws heavily on third-party information, notably a report by our GSI col-
leagues (IISD, 2013).
5. Proposal for a new template for notiﬁcation of fossil fuel subsidies
If information provided by an NGO is to be useful, it has to be in the language of
the WTO; that is, the data must ﬁt the ASCM deﬁnition of subsidy, must be
comparable across measures and countries, and must use a standard template com-
parable to a WTO notiﬁcation. The information in a WTO notiﬁcation is the
answer to a question posed implicitly or explicitly by a WTO agreement. The
generic deﬁnition of a notiﬁcation in the WTO Glossary is ‘a transparency
obligation requiring member governments to report trade measures to the relevant
WTO body if the measuresmight have an effect on other Members’. In most cases,
the notiﬁcation is structured by a questionnaire or template developed by the
relevant body, and increasingly the resulting data are being placed in the new
Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP), a publicly available and searchable
database.
The virtue of templates is that their use ensures that the same types of data are
collected for every Member, and every subsidy, and that the results can be compiled
in a database that allows simple comparison and aggregation. If NGOs are
to contribute data on energy subsidies, they must provide it in such a standard
format. Having a template helps provide a clear path for researchers. As more
people use it and test it, there is a double dividend: feedback helps improve
estimation and reporting methods, and the data become more comparable across
different studies –which can only happen if the WTO or some other body ensures
that all such third-party notiﬁcations are publicly available.
Our colleagues in the Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) have long argued that
the subsidies questionnaire used by the SCM Committee (discussed above) is in-
adequate, and have proposed a template for governments to use in preparing
subsidies notiﬁcations to the WTO in a more structured and consistent manner
(Steenblik and Simón, 2011). The GSI encouraged governments to use the template
for their notiﬁcations to the WTO, and carried out a project to assess and organize
German subsidies using the template (Thöne and Dobroschke, 2008). For reasons
discussed elsewhere (Wolfe, 2013: 18–19), WTO notiﬁcation remains weak, and
Members do not use the template. When voluntary reporting by governments does
not work because they seemingly lack the incentive to notify, third parties have a
role to play in identifying and collecting information about subsidies that would be
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accessible in the WTO format (Thöne and Dobroschke, 2008: 23–24). We think
that NGOs and individual researchers could use a modiﬁed version of the GSI
template, particularly in countries with good budgetary transparency or countries
in which information is available from other international organizations (whether
NGOs have sufﬁcient means to notify this information to theWTO is a question we
have yet to explore.)
The GSI is concerned with fossil fuel subsidies and energy subsidies more broadly
because of their effect on environmental quality, economic development, govern-
ance, and hence on sustainable development in general. The GSI therefore applies
an expansive meaning to fossil fuel subsidies, but one based on the deﬁnition of a
subsidy formulated in the ASCM – see the checklist in Appendix 1 below. The main
difference with the ASCM is that the GSI does not include a beneﬁt analysis (ASCM
Article 1.1(b)) when identifying energy subsidies, nor does it limit its research to
speciﬁc subsidies (Article 2). Consequently, a broad range of economic support
measures are included in the GSI’s work, including both production and con-
sumption subsidies.
The template that we propose in Appendix 2 is thus based on the WTO
deﬁnition, taking into account the subcategories that the GSI developed to facilitate
the understanding of the deﬁnition. While initially developed by the GSI for use by
governments, this template as modiﬁed can serve as the basis for notiﬁcations of
fossil fuel subsidies by NGOs.
The proposed template contains two parts. The notiﬁcation summary in the ﬁrst
part provides a quick overview of what different subsidization programs look like
in a given country, organized in a table according to a chosen classiﬁcation system.
The Harmonized System (HS), which would organize subsidies by product, has the
advantage of being familiar to most WTO Members. The International Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation of All Economic Activities (ISIC) would allow organization
of energy subsidies by economic activity (Steenblik and Simón, 2011). National
account statistics of countries are already often structured according to economic
activity (agriculture, ﬁshing, mining, manufacturing, retail, etc.). Using ISIC also
offers the advantage of having a discussion on subsidies where Members can im-
mediately compare the amount of subsidies related to a particular economic
activity, rather than to a product. Finally, when subsidies are organized according
to the ISIC system, Members could discuss what kinds of activities related to fossil
fuels they do not consider problematic and those that they do, which should be
subject to reductions.
The second part is a detailed description by subsidy program of the conditions
and objective of the subsidy. The checklist of energy subsidies (Appendix 1) allows
researchers to identify consumption and production subsidies for fossil fuels, as
well as subsidies for renewable energy (Beaton et al., 2013). The type of subsidy
will subsequently determine the method of measuring the amount. For example,
direct government expenditure can easily be deﬁned by looking at the government’s
budget, while tax exemptions have to be measured against a reference level.
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The concept of ‘price support’ in WTO jurisprudence includes direct government
intervention in the market intended to ﬁx the price of a good at a particular level,
for example, through the purchase of surplus production when price is set above
the market-clearing level (see WTO, 2012d: para. 7.85).
In line with the GSI approach, our template does not ask if a subsidy is
speciﬁc – a judgment that in the end can only be made by Members through ques-
tions in the SCM Committee or the dispute settlement system on a case-by-case
basis. Our objective, and a further reason for using the TPRM, is to shine a light on
all subsidies that cause market distortions and therefore have an impact on the
trading system. Any support measure from a central or sub-central government that
is applicable to natural gas, oil, coal, or peat will fall under that category and could
be notiﬁed by an NGO. We have found in examining subsidy notiﬁcations
thatMembers hardly ever provide data to calculate the trade effect of a subsidy, but
some discussion on this point will be essential in each case in order to help
Members see the WTO relevance of the measure. Both consumer and producer
fossil fuel subsidies have an effect on the trading system. Producer subsidies provide
a competitive advantage to the recipient. Consumer subsidies favour local
industries that are energy intensive. If energy as an input becomes cheaper through
fossil fuel subsidization, the producers of energy intensive goods will gain an
advantage.
Providing for the amount of a subsidy in the notiﬁcations would allow for better
discussions. Small subsidies might not be a concern to other Members, while very
large subsidization programs might provoke questions and debate. Direct govern-
ment expenditure will be easier to measure than tax exemptions. NGOs can rely on
different methods to calculate subsidies or rely on the data of the OECD, IMF, and
IEA to provide the information for this column.
Finally, veriﬁcation by the Secretariat will be easier if the NGO notiﬁcation
contains the source of the information, including legislative authority for the
measure, and any other documentary evidence. The notiﬁcation should also
contain the source for any quantitative data or the calculation of the amount of a
subsidy.
6. Conclusion: shining a light on fossil fuel subsidies
Trade and the environment are entwined, and one nexus is subsidies. The preamble
of the WTO Agreement records Members’ commitment to enhanced trade
‘allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development’. Our aim in this paper was to consider the
role of transparency in advancing toward this goal of a trading system that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs. This preambular goal remains hard to deﬁne in legal
obligations, even if new negotiations were in prospect, but we think Members can
nevertheless hold themselves accountable for progress in this direction. We think
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that civil society can help, as it did in the long process of developing the information
and analysis to underpin the framing of ﬁsheries subsidies as an appropriate subject
for negotiations in the WTO.
Fossil fuel subsidies offer an example of a signiﬁcant climate change problem
where new trade rules are unlikely in the short term, and where an NGO con-
tribution to increased transparency could make a difference. Fossil fuel subsidies
divert precious resources from other pressing needs and add colossal sums to
national debt. These perverse subsidies provide a strong incentive to prefer carbon-
based fuels to the alternatives, and they affect resource allocation in ways
that are unfavourable to other, cleaner forms of energy. Their use clearly affects
patterns of international trade, even if speciﬁc harm to trading partners is not
always easily identiﬁed. The ASCM ought to be a useful tool to discipline such
subsidies, but this agreement is not effective: Members either fail to notify their
subsidies, or notify only sporadically. As a result, harmful subsidies continue to
undermine sustainable development and the WTO’s overall goal remains distant,
or even recedes.
We think that imaginative use of existing transparency mechanisms can help.
We focus not on the so-called ‘enforcement’ of precise legal obligations, because the
real life of the trading system is elsewhere, and because it is hard to enforce a
preamble. This paper therefore offers a proposal on how more information about
fossil fuel subsidies can be brought into the WTO as the basis for analysis and
further discussion. With more information, Members can learn from each other
while publication in TPR reports may help citizens learn that certain kinds of
policies in favour of both consumers and producers are in fact perverse subsidies.
Our analysis of the negotiating history of ASCM Article 8, and the broader
difﬁculties in the Doha Round, lead us to conclude that no new provisions for
energy subsidies will be added to the WTO any time soon. We must work with
what exists, but what exists can make a signiﬁcant contribution to the analysis of
fossil fuel subsidies within the context of both an individual country’s trade and
economic policy and the effects of subsidies on the trading system. We have found
no example of the SCM Committee using third-party notiﬁcation, so the target for
our proposal is the TPRB, but we remain consistent with the deﬁnition of subsidies
in the ASCM, ‘as if’ Article 8 were still in force; that is, a Member who wished
could use an NGO TPR notiﬁcation as the basis for a legitimate question in the
SCM Committee. We think that the Secretariat should make energy subsidies a
separate subsection of every TPR and every monitoring report. Having more
comprehensive data can only help discussions about the trade implications of
energy subsidies and climate change. Such enhanced surveillance, far from
providing raw material for more disputes, will help to clarify the principles and
rules applicable to energy, thereby avoiding disputes. And that clariﬁcation
is essential if the WTO is to be in a position to support rather than obstruct
global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, one of the deﬁning issues of
our time.
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Appendix 1. GSI Checklist for identifying energy subsidies
Direct and indirect transfer of
funds and liabilities ASCM
Article 1.1 (a)(1)(i)
Direct spending Earmarks
Agency appropriations and contracts
Research and development support
Government ownership of
energy-related enterprises
Security-related enterprises
Municipal utilities and public power
Credit support Government loans and loan guarantees
Subsidized credit to domestic infrastructure and power plants
Subsidized credit to oil and gas related exports
Insurance and indemniﬁcation Government insurance/indemniﬁcation
Statutory caps on commercial liability
Occupational health and accidents Assumption of occupational health and accident liabilities
Environmental costs Responsibility for closure and post-closure risks
Waste management
Environmental damages
Government revenue foregone
ASCM Article 1.1 (a)(1)(ii)
Tax breaks and special taxes Tax expenditures
Overall tax burden by industry
Excise taxes/special taxes
Provision of goods or services
below market value
ASCM Article 1.1 (a)(1)(iii)
Government-owned energy minerals Process for mineral leasing
Royalty relief or reductions in other taxes due on extraction
Process of paying royalties due
Government-owned natural resources or land Access to government-owned natural resources land
Government-owned infrastructure Use of government-provided infrastructure
Government procurement Government purchase of goods or services at above-market rates
Government-provided goods or services Government-provided goods or services at below-market rates
Income or price support
ASCM Article 1.1 (a)(2)
Market price support and regulation Consumption mandates and feed-in tariffs (FITs)
Border protection or restrictions
Regulatory loopholes
Regulated prices set at below-market rates
Regulated prices set at above-market rates
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Appendix 2. Template for the Notiﬁcation of Fossil Fuel Subsidies to the WTO
I. Notiﬁcation summary
II. Notiﬁcation appendix
1. Authority providing the subsidy (state agency involved, and legislative basis
where available)
2. Purpose of the subsidy
3. Title of the program
4. To whom and how the assistance is provided
5. Amount –with source for any calculation (e.g. OECD, IEA, IMF, GSI)
6. Duration
7. Potential effect on trade – can be qualitative or quantitative
8. Source of the information
Appendix 3. Comparison of reporting support measures for fossil fuels,
2008–2013
ISIC
Code
Government
Level
Regional
Designation
Subsidy
Type
Program
Name
Target
Beneﬁciaries
Duration Amount
Country WTO SCM notiﬁcation OECD inventory G-20 voluntary
Albania 1 0 0
Argentina 0 0 2
Australia Fed: 2; state: 1 Fed: 18; State: 28 0
Austria (EU) 0 7 0
Belgium (EU) 0 12 0
Brazil 1 0 3
Canada 0 Fed: 9; Prov: 67 3
Chile 0 4 0
Czech Republic (EU) 0 9 0
Denmark (EU) 0 7 0
Estonia (EU) 0 17 0
European Union 1 0 0
Finland (EU) 1 18 0
France (EU) 0 34 0
Germany (EU) 0 28 1
Greece (EU) 0 8 0
Hungary (EU) 0 7 0
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(Cont.)
Country WTO SCM notiﬁcation OECD inventory G-20 voluntary
Iceland 0 1 0
India Sub-federal: 11 0 4
Indonesia 0 0 3
Ireland (EU) 0 3 0
Israel 0 4 0
Italy (EU) 0 10 1
Japan 13 18 0
Korea 1 13 2
Luxembourg (EU) 0 4 0
Mexico 2 6 2
Netherlands (EU) 0 6 0
New Zealand 0 8 0
Norway 1 16 0
Peru 1 0 0
Poland (EU) 1 16 0
Portugal (EU) 0 9 0
Romania (EU) 1 0 0
Russian Federation 1 0 0
Slovak Republic (EU) 1 10 0
Slovenia (EU) 0 10 0
Spain (EU) 1 9 1
Sweden (EU) 0 29 0
Switzerland 0 4 0
Taiwan 2 0 0
Turkey 0 10 1
Ukraine 1 0 0
United Kingdom (EU) 1 14 0
United States Fed: 8; State: 6 Fed: 20 State: 147 12
Totals: 59 640 35
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